Abstract: Th e article discusses possible models of disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors in Poland. In the fi rst, the so-called "corporate" model, disciplinary commissions of both instances are composed only of prosecutors. In the second, the so-called "mixed" model, in the fi rst instance the disciplinary commission, composed only of prosecutors, delivers a judgment and the appeal goes to the court. Th e last model introduces single disciplinary proceedings for judges, prosecutors, advocates, legal advisors and notaries. In this model cases are heard by courts with the right to appeal the judgment to the Supreme Court. Th e article seeks to answer the question which model is best adjusted to disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors in Poland.
Introduction
Disciplinary liability of prosecutors is a type of a quasi-criminal legal liability rooted in the sphere of repressive law , changes within the scope of disciplinary proceedings ensuing from it have not responded to fundamental reservations about the shape of prosecutors' disciplinary liability already formulated on the basis of previously binding provisions
5
. Th e new Act has not changed regulations on the model of disciplinary jurisdiction in the context of investigating authorities merely copying the previous model of disciplinary jurisdiction operating under the Act of 1985 6 . As diff erent solutions within this scope have been proposed in the past, it is worth examining them more closely. A possibility of introducing a diff erent shape of disciplinary jurisdiction continues to incite a lot of controversy mostly due to the fact that prosecutors may be deprived of exclusive competence of disciplinary sentencing in the fi rst and second instance in cases pertaining to them while these powers could be fully or partially handed over to common courts' jurisdiction. For this reason, a purpose of this study will be to present possible models of disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors with regard to the criterion of investigating authority carrying out disciplinary proceedings and answer the question which model is most suitable to address the existing problems of disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors. Other elements that are equally important for the model of disciplinary proceedings such as, among others, competence of Disciplinary Ombudsman , limitation period, or a possibility of challenging disciplinary rulings through cassation or re-opening of the proceedings as well as the issue of transparency of proceedings will not be discussed herein for editorial limitations.
Models of disciplinary jurisdiction -general comments
According to the criterion of authorities (panels) adjudicating in these proceedings, three models of disciplinary proceedings may be distinguished for the needs of this study. Th e fi rst one, which is currently valid, hands over the second Th e main point is to ensure, postulated for a long time, publicity for the prosecutor's disciplinary proceedings -see K. Kremens, Jawność prokuratorskich postępowań dyscyplinarnych, "Prokuratura i Prawo" 2015, No. 5, p. 128-142. 5 See for instance: P. Kardas, Rola i miejsce prokuratury w systemie organów demokratycznego państwa prawnego. Kilka uwag o przesłankach determinujących założenia projektu ustawy o prokuraturze, "Prokuratura i Prawo" 2012, No. 9, p. 44; P. Czarnecki, Postępowanie dyscyplinarne…, op. cit., p. 435 oraz K. Kremens, Odpowiedzialność zawodowa prokuratorów, Warszawa 2010, pp. 18-19. 6 Th e identical model of disciplinary proceedings was in force pursuant to the Act of 20 June 1985 on the Public Prosecutor's Offi ce (consolidated text Joural of Laws of 2011 , No. 270, item 1599 . Th e new Act on the Public Prosecutor's Offi ce has not changed in this resepct.
, which are solely composed of prosecutors, with a possibility of bringing cassation against the second instance ruling to the Supreme Court. Th e second model, conventionally called as "mixed" and described in one of the previously proposed draft s of the Act on Prosecutors of 20 February 2014 8 , assumed examination of disciplinary cases in the fi rst instance by the "corporate" court, and in the second instance -by the common court (or the Supreme Court). Subsequently, cassation against the ruling could be submitted to the Supreme Court.
Th e third model contained in the draft ed Act on Disciplinary Proceedings against Individuals Practicing Some Legal Professions of 2013 9 assumed the introduction of uniform disciplinary jurisdiction for judges, prosecutors, attorneys, legal advisors and notaries. According to this model, specially established disciplinary divisions in appellate courts were to sentence in the fi rst instance while in the second instancethe Supreme Court. Cassation against second instance rulings was not admitted 10 . Examples of other solutions, which can be called as sub-models, may also be found in other Acts. For instance, disciplinary proceedings against court executive offi cers (see the Act of 29 August 1997 on Court Executive Offi cers and Execution, uniform text: Journal of Laws of 2011, No. 231, item 1376) envisage examination of the case in the fi rst instance by a disciplinary committee whereas in the second instance -by the regional court competent according to the offi cial seat of the accused court executive offi cer (Art. 75 par. 1-2). At the same time, cassation against the ruling of the second instance is not admitted at all. On the other hand, disciplinary proceedings against tax advisors (the Act of 5 July 1996 on Tax Advisory Services, uniform text: Journal of Laws of 2011, No. 41, item 213) envisages handing over second instance disciplinary proceedings to "corporate" courts and a concurrent possibility of appealing to the common court, i.e. the Court of Appeals -the Court of Employment and Social Security competent according to the place of residence of the accused (Art. 75 par. 1 of the Act on Tax Advisory Services). Cassation to the Supreme Court has not been admitted here too.
7
Th e author is aware of the conventionality and certain inadequacy of the use of the term "corporate" in the disciplinary courts of both prosecutors and judges. However, due to the common understanding of this phrase, it will be used as a shorthand for the purposes of this study. 
Th e "corporate" model of disciplinary jurisdiction against prosecutors
Pursuant to the currently valid regulation, in the fi rst instance, disciplinary proceedings are carried out before Disciplinary Tribunals while in the second instance -before Appellate Disciplinary Tribunals (Art. § 1 of the Act on Prosecutors). A number of disciplinary tribunals and a general number of members of disciplinary tribunals are established by the National Council of Prosecutors (Art. 43 § 3 of the Act on Prosecutors). Disciplinary judges themselves are elected among all prosecutors by the Assembly of Prosecutors, i.e. collegiate authorities located in Appellate Prosecutors' Offi ces, and the Meeting of Prosecutors in the National Prosecution General Service (Art. 45 and 47 of the Act on Prosecutors). Th e composition of a disciplinary tribunal is designated by the Chairman according to the list of all judges of a given tribunal in the order the cases are submitted, but the composition of the tribunal is always made of at least one prosecutor from the organizational prosecution unit equal to the one where the accused was employed or performed offi cial activity at the moment of the commission of an act (Art. 147 § 1 of the Act on Prosecutors)
11
. A full "corporate nature" of prosecutors' disciplinary jurisdiction has been broken by a possibility of bringing cassation against a fi nal and valid disciplinary ruling passed in the second instance to the Supreme Court (Art. 163 § 1 of the Act on Prosecutors). Th e scope of cassation is wider than the one envisaged in the provisions on criminal proceedings
12
. According to the Constitutional Tribunal, such a state of aff airs does not arise doubts and is considered to be a suffi cient judicial control of disciplinary rulings passed against prosecutors by Prosecutors' Disciplinary Tribunals
13
.
11
Derogation from the order in which cases are brought to court is possible only in case of illness of a member of the court or for another important reason, which should be indicated in the order on the appointment of the hearing or the meeting. 12
In criminal proceedings, cassation may be brought only because of the defi ciencies listed in art. 439 CCP. (the so-called absolute reasons for appeal) or other gross violation of law, if it could have a signifi cant impact on the content of the decision, but it can not be brought solely because of the disproportionate penalty (Article 523 par. of the CCP). Art. 163 para. 1 of the Act on Prosecutors, on the other hand, states that cassation may be brought both because of a gross violation of the law and a gross incommensurability of the disciplinary penalty. 13
In the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 June 2012, sygn. K 9/10, OTK-A 2012, No. 6, item 66, the Constitutional Tribunal held that "the scope of the judicial control proceedings in disciplinary matters designated by the challenged provisions is in line with art. 45 para. 1 of the Constitution. Th e Court considered that the adoption of a control model in which cassation can be brought only because of "gross violation of law" and "gross incommensurability of a disciplinary sanction" falls within the limits of freedom of law by the ordinary legislature and does not violate the principle of fair hearing and resulting from it an obligation of a proper shape of the court procedure. "
Th e "mixed" model of disciplinary jurisdiction
Th e reasoning to the draft of 2014 underlined that a purpose of the "mixed" model endeavours to achieve "objectivization of fi rst instance disciplinary tribunals' rulings by the introduction of appellate courts' cognition" because the "corporate" model of disciplinary jurisdiction has been exhausted 14 . Th is draft assumed serious changes in disciplinary jurisdiction against prosecutors whilst its most vital element was entrusting the second instance disciplinary jurisdiction with appellate courts or the Supreme Court. Disciplinary Tribunal in the Prosecution General and disciplinary tribunals in appellate prosecutors' offi ces were to become fi rst instance courts in disciplinary cases (Art. 169 § 1 of the draft of 2014) depending on the accused 15 . Furthermore, the changes were to embrace decentralization of the fi rst instance disciplinary jurisdiction and modifi cation of a manner of election of disciplinary tribunals' members. Th e second instance disciplinary jurisdiction against prosecutors was to be transferred to the Supreme Court with regard to cases heard in the fi rst instance by the Disciplinary Tribunal in the Prosecution General and appellate courts with regard to cases heard in the fi rst instance by disciplinary tribunals in appellate prosecutors' offi ces (Art. 169 § 2 of the draft of 2014). A competent appellate court according to the venue of the second instance disciplinary tribunal was to be the court within the jurisdiction of the fi rst instance disciplinary tribunal (Art. 172 § 1 of the draft of 2014).
Disciplinary Tribunal in the Prosecution General was to be composed of prosecutors of the Prosecution General 16 (Art. 171 § 1 of the draft of 2014). Th e composition of disciplinary tribunals in appellate prosecutors' offi ces was to include prosecutors of the appellate prosecutors' offi ce as well as prosecutors from competent regional prosecutors' offi ces according to the relevant appellate prosecutors' offi ce in a number refl ecting the number of prosecutors of the appellate prosecutors' offi ce as well as prosecutors from competent regional prosecutors' offi ces according to the relevant appellate prosecutors' offi ce in the same number elected by the Assembly of 14 Th e reasons of the draft of 2014, p. 71. 15
Th e Supreme Court was to be appointed to hear cases against the Prosecutor General, prosecutors of the General Prosecutor's Offi ce, Chief Executive Offi cer, Director of the Main Commission, Director of the Lustration Offi ce, appellate prosecutors and their deputies, district prosecutors and their deputies, as well as prosecutors delegated to the General Prosecutor's Offi ce, Ministry of Justice, National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution, if the disciplinary off enses were committed during the period of delegation. In turn, disciplinary courts established in the appellate prosecutor's offi ces were to conduct proceedings against other prosecutors (Article 170 para. 1 of the draft of 2014) in accordance with the local jurisdiction corresponding to the place of committing the act which was the subject of proceedings before the disciplinary court (Art. 170 para. 2 of the draft of 2014).
16
Th e Prosecutor General and his deputies as well as the disciplinary spokesman were excluded from this group.
Prosecutors in the appellate prosecutors' offi ce (Art. 171 § 2 of the draft of 2014)
17
. Moreover, the draft introduced a mixed adjudicating panel in every case, which meant that a disciplinary tribunal had to be randomly appointed each time so that it included a prosecutor of the appellate prosecutors' offi ce, a prosecutor of the regional prosecutors' offi ce and a prosecutor of the district prosecutors' offi ce (Art. 171 § 10 of the draft of 2014). Th e composition of the second instance disciplinary tribunal was to be randomly selected from the list of all judges of a given court; it had to include at least one judge who sentenced in criminal cases on permanent basis (Art. 171 § 4 of the draft of 2014).
Th is model appeared to meet the requirements formulated in supranational legal regulations in the best way. Although the UN' assumed that rulings in the fi rst instance disciplinary proceedings should be examined by the tribunal composed of prosecutors while the second instance was to be independent and sovereign, which apparently may only be assured by a court. One of the giudes states that disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors shall guarantee an objective evaluation and decision, which is in favor of conducting prosecutor disciplinary proceedings by judges who guarantee the most far-reaching objectivism because of the value of iindependence assigned to this offi ce. Another statement of the Guidelines inicates that the decision shall be subject to independent review which also should be interpreted that also in this case it should be a judicial body. Despite an apparent lack of a possibility to introduce such a solution now due to serious constitutional doubts 28 , this draft is still worth analyzing. It proposed to introduce a uniform mechanism of sentencing in disciplinary cases involving legal professions such as common court judges and prosecutors of common organizational units of prosecution service including the retired ones, as well as prosecutor's assessors, attorneys and attorney trainees, legal advisors and legal advisor trainees, court executive offi cers, court executive offi cer's assessors and trainees, notaries, notaries' assessors and trainees (Art. 1 of the draft of udj.). At the same time, the draft envisaged to maintain existing prerequisites of disciplinary liability separate for each legal profession in individual Acts (Art. 2 of the draft of udj.)
Th e model of uniform disciplinary jurisdiction for individuals practicing some legal professions
29 . Pursuant to the draft , appellate courts were to become fi rst instance disciplinary tribunals while disciplinary divisions were to be established for this purpose within appellate courts; the Supreme Court was to become the second instance disciplinary tribunal (Art. 4 of the draft of udj.). Th e competence of the fi rst instance tribunal was to be designated by the offi cial venue of service in case of prosecutors and judges, or a seat -in case of attorneys, legal advisors, notaries and court executive offi cers (Art. 5 of the draft of udj.). Legitimate disciplinary judges were to become judges of a given appellate court except its President and Deputy Presidents (Art. 6 par. 2 of the draft of udj.).
A lot of criticizing arguments were raised against the draft both in 2006 and aft er it was resubmitted; yet they were not absolute 30 . It was even argued that the eff ect of cessed: 6.12.2016 r.). 28
Although this issue does not seem to be as obvious as it recognizes the environment (see the statement of Deputy Minister of Justice M. Królikowski during the debate on the project, reported by "Gazeta Prawna" of 18 April 2013, which, however, clearly contradicts the government's position expressed in response to the bill of 14 June 2013), this is clearly pointed out by A. Bojańczyk. See. A. Bojańczyk, Opinia do projektu…, op. cit. See also the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 June 2012, K 9/10, OTK-A 2012, No. 6, item 66 (Th e proceedings before the Tribunal took place abecause of the request submitted by the Ombudsman to examine the constitutionality of provisions regulating the scope of judicial review of disciplinary proceedings of lawyers, legal advisors, notaries and prosecutors. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the current form of cassation proceedings enables a real and eff ective control of judgments of disciplinary courts, which is why judicial review of judgments issued in disciplinary proceedings by advocates, legal advisers, notaries and prosecutors held by the Supreme Court should be considered as a control that meets both constitutional and convention standards). 29
In the opinion of the draft sman, " [in] this way, the specifi ty of performing a given legal profession will be respected and the standards of professional ethics specifi ed by particular groups will be respected. Also, constitutionally entrusted to professional self-governments, custody over the performance of the profession will be preserved (see Uzasadnienie projektu jednolitego sądownictwa dyscyplinarnego). 30
A. Bojańczyk pointed out in 2006 that "both from the technical and legal point of view, unifying the model of the disciplinary proceedings and creating a uniform act of disciplinary proceedings undoubtedly makes sense and deserves approval" -A. Bojańczyk, W sprawie…, op. cit., . See also Stanowisko Rządu z dnia 14 czerwca 2013 r…, op. cit., p. 2 (It was indicated, fi rstly, uniformity in the form of the liquidation of diff erences between separate disciplinary proceedings was likely to permit development of uniform disciplinary practice in the future 31 . Undeniably, it would certainly benefi t all legal professions. However, the shape of solutions itself proposed by the draft ers was seriously criticized. According to A. Bojańczyk, "disciplinary jurisdiction is an element of «custody over a due performance of a profession» of public trust"
32
. Moreover, the Constitution Tribunal's case law was invoked, according to which a task of the professional selfgovernment is "the observance of the right quality -substantially and legally -of the activities composing «the performance of professions»"
33 . Yet the submitted draft fully abolished the participation of self-government from disciplinary proceedings. Th e government's opinion on the draft , on the other hand, emphasized that even if all constitutional and purposeful aspects were ignored, the introduction of uniform jurisdiction for individuals practicing some legal professions would have to trigger serious social consequences resulting from the transfer of entire disciplinary jurisdiction to common courts and Supreme Court's cognition 34 . It would inevitably entail an increased case load of these authorities whilst a number of cases carried out annually is not insignifi cant at all 35 .
Conclusion
Th e current model of disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors based on the "corporate" model apparently requires further changes. Apart from some defects thereof as, e.g., prolonged proceedings oft en resulting in the limitation of disciplinary off ences, one of the problems is the structure of disciplinary tribunals criticized for their "corporate nature", which may evoke certain doubts in the context of objectivism of the rulings they pass. Th is model, which was upheld by the new Act on Prosecutors that "this proposal is not consistent with the interpretation of art. 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the principle of entrusting local governments with custody over the performance of public trust professions", and secondly that corporate disciplinary courts have ethical behavior patterns related to the jurisdiction of a given legal profession and "are much more able to understand and distinguish ethical behavior, which should characterize her member"). of 2016, may be contrasted with the model of uniform disciplinary jurisdiction for individuals practicing some legal professions. However, this proposal, which has been widely criticized for its unconstitutionality, arises serious doubts too. Th ey are connected with a possible excessive case load of appellate courts which could be burdened with trivial disciplinary cases that are now heard by corporate disciplinary committees. Despite these arguments, although this proposal is interesting and may even be prospective, it cannot be preserved due to diversity of legal trainings for individual legal professions and, most of all, distinctiveness of their duties and ethical models they should follow 36 . It obviously does not mean that uniform disciplinary jurisdiction (for example in the USA) guarantees that disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors are actually carried out frequently and eff ectively. Just the opposite, they are absolutely rare, which is oft en criticized 37 . Hence it appears that the establishment of uniform disciplinary jurisdiction is not in itself a remedy for the problems of disciplinary proceedings carried out against prosecutors in Poland. Th erefore the answer to the necessary reform of disciplinary jurisdiction of prosecutors and at least partial objectivization of the case law appears to be the "mixed" model of disciplinary jurisdiction submitted in 2014, according to which "corporate" disciplinary tribunals would sentence in the fi rst instance whereas appellate courts (or the Supreme Court) would sentence in the second instance. Perhaps we should return to this idea. Such a structure of disciplinary jurisdiction of prosecutors would also better fulfi l postulates expressed in acts of international law referring to prosecutors. Bojańczyk A., W sprawie dwóch rozwiązań procesowych projektu ustawy o nowym ustroju dyscyplinarnym niektórych zawodów prawniczych, " Palestra" 2007, No. 9-10. 36 Although the author of this study in the past expressed hope about the possibility of considering the adoption of such a model (K. Kremens, Odpowiedzialność..., op. cit., to believe that this idea should arouse interest and lead to discussion on the model of disciplinary liability of legal practitioners in Poland, and consequently also on the shape of legal education and the legitimacy of maintaining separate training for representatives of various legal professions, currently on the ground content of art. 17 of the Constitution, it seems that there is no possibility of introducing such a model. Review" 2010 , vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 1587 -1620 
